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An ideal system of international payments should be characterized by stability and 
balance: stability in exchange rates and the absence of sudden crises, and balance in the 
sense that individual national economies should suffer neither from the deflationary 
effects of chronic external deficits nor the distorting consequences of chronic external 
surpluses.  Both requirements are essential to the efficient international movement of 
capital.  Yet neither requirement appears to have been met by the current dollar-based 
reserve currency system.  Recurrent crises in Asia, Latin America and Eastern Europe, 
and chronic and growing U.S. payments deficits (with their associated deflationary 
impact) are long-standing characteristics of the current system.  
This chapter argues that the problems just described are fundamental aspects of 
the present system and that, without reform, they will continue to plague the global 
economy.  However, a simple set of institutional reforms would go a long way toward 
alleviating these difficulties.  In order to understand the need for and nature of these 
reforms, we begin by analyzing the dynamics of the current system using a simple global 
macroeconomics framework.  Within this context, we examine a number of proposed 
explanations for current imbalances and ultimately focus on a small number of potentially 
responsible factors.  They bear a striking similarity to those which Keynes cited in 
connection with the failure of the pre-Bretton Woods system.  The chapter then lays out 
reforms designed to alleviate these problems.  Finally, it ends with a broader analysis of 
the costs and benefits of such a reformed system.  
Issues of reform of the global reserve system have achieved increasing attention, 
especially since the UN Commission on the Reform of the Global Monetary and 
Financial System, chaired by Stiglitz, suggested that this was the most important item on 
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the longer-term agenda for ensuring a more stable global financial system.  China’s 
Central Bank governor has added his voice to those suggesting a need for a reform.4   
We argue that a key explanation for the massive global imbalances that prevailed 
in the years prior to the crisis—and whose disorderly unwinding has been a recurrent 
subject of concern—is the large increase in the demand for reserves, partially explained 
in turn by the need for self-insurance against global instability.  This has been a persistent 
problem in recent years, but the crisis has given immediacy to the demands for reform for 
two reasons.  First, those holding large amounts of dollars have suddenly become aware 
of the riskiness of their reserve holdings; the dollar has become a poor store of value, as 
its value has decreased and become volatile.  But worse, the massive debt and massive 
lending by the Fed have stoked worries about the risk of a decrease in the value of the 
dollar as a result of inflation.  Compounding the problem is that the return on T-bills has 
fallen to near-zero.  Countries holding dollars in reserves are bearing risk without reward, 
and quite naturally, the citizens of these countries have become worried that the assets 
which they view as having resulted from their hard work and thrift will become quickly 
dissipated away.  These concerns have been reinforced by the large losses by China’s 
sovereign wealth funds on its investment in Blackstone.  (China’s premier’s stern 
warning to the U.S., to maintain the value of what China has invested in the U.S., needs 
to be seen in this light.)  
 




An analysis of the macrodynamics of the global economy must begin with an analysis of 
the macroeconomic balances within each of its constituent economies.  Those balances, 
in turn, rest on the equality of savings and investment.  Formally, in any national 
economy, domestic investments plus the net foreign surplus (NFS), which corresponds to 
net overseas investment, must equal the sum of net private savings (NPS) by households 
and firms and net government savings (NGS), the surplus in aggregate government 
budgets.  For ease of future reference we will designate this as  
 I + NFS ≡NPS + NGS  
or, in terms of external balance,  
 NFS ≡ NPS + NGS – I        (1) 
 This formulation presupposes nothing about whether the economies in question 
are fully classical, with interest rates adjusting to ensure satisfaction of equation (1) at 
full-employment, or subject to Keynsian unemployment, with the level of output being an 
important equilibrating variable whose distance from full-employment depends on the 
efficacy of monetary and fiscal policy.   
The fundamental discipline imposed by any international monetary system is 
embodied in the fact that the sum over all countries of net foreign surplus must be zero, 
namely  
ΣNFSi = ΣNPSi + ΣNGSi – ΣIi ≡ 0               (2)   
where the summations are taken over all individual national economies.5  Equations (1) 
and (2) together with the behavioral regularities determining their individual components 
govern the dynamics of the international monetary system.  (1) and (2) are identities, and 
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are always true.  It will be useful to look at that system from the perspective of these two 
equations. 
 
The Twin Deficits Theory 
 
The standard analysis of trade deficits is based on the theory of the twin deficits, which 
holds that when a country has a fiscal deficit, it is likely to have a current account deficit 
as well.  
In a partial equilibrium setting the relationship is clear: ceteris paribus, any 
increase in the government deficit reduces domestic national saving.6  In equilibrium, 
capital inflows have to equal the difference between domestic investment and domestic 
savings; but capital inflows also have to equal the difference between imports and 
exports.  Hence, if domestic savings falls and nothing else changes, then capital inflows 
and the trade deficit must increase.   
In terms of equation (1), the twin deficit theory assumes that I and NPS remain 
unchanged.  Of course, in the real world, ceteris paribus does not hold.  Some economists 
have argued that when fiscal deficits increase, taxpayers, realizing that there are future 
bills to be paid, increase their savings in a fully offsetting way.  (This is called the Barro-
Ricardo model).  If that were true, increased fiscal deficits would be accompanied by 
increased private savings, and national savings would be unaffected.  Increases in fiscal 
deficits would not be accompanied by increases in trade deficits.  There would be no such 
thing as the “twin deficits.”    
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This is an example of a “theory” that, although widely taught, especially in 
graduate schools, makes little sense and has little empirical support.7  What has been 
happening recently in the U.S. provides a dramatic illustration.  Under President Bush, 
fiscal deficits had risen, but household saving had actually declined (to zero, or even 
negative in some quarters).  When one hears somebody say, “Economic theory says…” 
one must be cautious.  Often such statements refer to a theory that assumes perfect 
markets, perfect information, and perfect risk sharing, in an economy with identical 
individuals living infinitely long.  The assumptions are suspect, at best, in the most 
advanced industrialized countries and certainly not true in the developing world.    
The Barro-Ricardo model, though implausible, does make one important point: 
we are not living in a ceteris paribus world; there are lots of other things going on 
simultaneously.  We have to be careful in analyzing what are endogenous and what are 
exogenous variables. 
A (cyclical) increase in investment, for instance, may lead to an increase in GDP, 
an (cyclical) increase in government and private savings, and an increase in imports.  
Whether capital inflows decrease or increase depends on whether government and private 
savings increase to fully offset (or not quite offset) the increase in investment.  In this 
case, both the government deficit and the trade deficit are endogenous variables.   
Both cross sectional and time series data make clear that there is no simple 
relationship between fiscal and trade deficits.  Figure 17.1 provides aggregate G-7 data 
on twin deficits (aggregate current account and government balances as a percent of 
GDP).  If one believed in the twin deficits argument, the data would be aligned along a 
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45 degree line through the origin; the two would increase in tandem.  In fact, no real 
pattern is discernible in the data.  
 
<Insert Figure 17.1> 
 
More interesting is the time series data, shown for the G-7 countries in the 
following figures.  Again, “twin deficit theory” has an obvious prediction:  an increase in 
the fiscal deficit should be quickly reflected in an increase in the current account deficit.  
We can evaluate this theory by examining time series data on the current account as a 
percent of GDP (country_CA_PGDP) and the government balance as a percent of GDP 
(country_GB_PGDP).   
Figure 17.2 shows data for the U.S. since 1980.  What is striking is that the trade 
deficit has been steadily increasing regardless of what happened with the fiscal deficit 
and regardless of who was in the White House.  The pattern goes back even earlier.  The 
U.S. government deficit rises steadily from the early 1970s to the late 1980s, begins to 
decline in the 1990s and moving into surplus in 1998, and finally rises sharply post-2000.  
In contrast, the current account deficit grows steadily throughout the period.  Thus, in the 
1990s the trade deficit increased, even as the fiscal deficit decreased.  (The good thing 
about the 1990s was that it was linked to an increase in investment.  In the present 
decade, under President Bush, money was to a large extent going into a consumption 
binge, with household savings approaching zero.  From a balance sheet perspective it did 
make a big difference; borrowing to finance consumption rather than to finance an asset 




<Insert Figure 17.2> 
 
<Insert Figure 17.3> 
 
<Insert Figure 17.4> 
 
<Insert Figure 17.5> 
 
<Insert Figure 17.6> 
 
<Insert Figure 17.7> 
 
 It is clear from the data that there is no systematic relationship between the trade 
deficit and the fiscal deficit; in other words, there is no such thing as the “twin deficits.”  
Actually, if one looks at the other G-7 countries, it is also apparent that there is no 
systematic relationship, except for in one country, Canada (see Figure 17.8).   
 
<Insert Figure 17.8> 
 
In the case of Canada there is a systematic relationship, but it is not the fiscal 
deficits that are giving rise to the trade deficits.  Rather, if we do a Granger causality test, 
it appears that the fiscal deficit is endogenous and is being driven by the trade deficit.  It 
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is actually easy to understand what is going on, on the basis of standard Keynesian 
economics.   
 
<Insert Table 17.1> 
 
Fiscal deficits help maintain the economy at full employment.  For a country like 
Canada, at least in the very short run, the trade deficit (capital inflows) is exogenous.  A 
downturn in the U.S. economy reduces, for instance, Canada’s exports to the U.S. and 
increases the trade deficit.  But as external circumstances affect the economy (e.g. exports 
going down), the government has to respond.  It typically uses fiscal policy to stimulate 
the economy to offset a potential threat of recession.  Thus, it is the fiscal deficit that 
follows the trade deficit.8  
While the notion that trade deficits drive fiscal deficits seems plausible for a small 
country like Canada, we want to examine the view that, at least in part, capital flows 
should be treated as exogenous for the United States, and increasingly so for Europe.  
 
The Demand for Reserves and Trade Deficits 
 
The problem with the twin-deficit theory (at least for the U.S.) is not just that it assumes 
that I and NPS are exogenous, but that it views the entire world from a U.S.-centric 
perspective.  Hidden behind all the behavioral equations are relative prices (i.e., exchange 
rates), and these are determined by the behavior of other countries as much as by the 
U.S., including their demands for holding U.S. dollar-denominated assets.  Any theory 
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attempting to explain the U.S. trade deficit must be based on a global general equilibrium 
model.  In this section, we present the simplest such model. 
In our current dollar-based reserve currency world a further specialization of 
equation (2) is useful 
 ΣNFS ≡ NFSR + NFSN ≡ 0   
and thus  
 NFSR ≡ NPSR + NGSR-IR ≡  – NFSN = -[NPSN + NGSN – IN ]  
where the subscript R denotes the reserve currency country and the subscript N, the sum 
of balances for the non-reserve currency countries.   
The different causes put forward to account for the chronic U.S. international 
deficit are readily identifiable within this context.  The basic “Twin-deficits” view that 
the imbalance is driven by U.S. government deficits and low savings rates amounts to 
assuming that the exogenous variables in this relationship are NPSR (relatively small
9), 
NGSR (large and negative) and IR (relatively large and positive) which together determine 
a level of NFSR that is large and negative (i.e. a large net foreign deficit).  In turn, this 
deficit drives surpluses in the rest of the non-US world.  This view is more broadly 
characteristic of a policy consensus which attributes international imbalances of 
individual countries to their management of variables on the RHS of equation (1).  The 
focus is on national behavior rather than the global constraints embodied in equation (2).   
While the twin deficit explanation of the trade deficit focuses on the U.S., and the 
misdeeds of the Bush Administration, others seek to shift the “blame” abroad.  For 
instance, America has consistently blamed China’s undervalued exchange rate.  A quick 
look at the numbers suggests what is wrong with such a claim:  The United States’ trade 
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deficit in 2006 was more than $850 billion, whereas China’s multilateral trade surplus 
was only about $150 billion; when the U.S. started talking about China’s trade 
imbalances, it was actually close to zero.  China has been growing very rapidly, but even 
if China were to eliminate its current $150 billion trade surplus with the U.S., and even if 
this reduction in the bilateral trade deficit were translated dollar for dollar into a reduction 
in the U.S. multilateral trade deficit, the U.S. deficit would still stand at some $700 
billion, or just under $2 billion per day.  In fact, the likely outcome of China eliminating 
its trade surplus would be a very small change in the U.S. multilateral trade deficit. The 
United States would quite simply start buying textiles and apparel from Cambodia, 
Bangladesh, or some other country rather than from China. 
There is a real risk that global instability might actually be increased, because 
while China may be willing to finance the U.S. deficit, it is not clear whether Cambodia 
or Bangladesh would.  It is plausible that these countries will think it better to invest their 
money into their own country; and if they do lend their money abroad, they are more 
likely to put it into Euros or yen, rather than just financing the U.S. deficits by holding 
dollars, which are a depreciating asset.  While it is true that even if China did not buy 
U.S. bonds another country would, to induce those purchases may require large changes 
in asset prices.  There is a high likelihood of what has come to be called a disorderly 
adjustment, and such adjustments are likely to be painful.  
While attempts to blame China for the U.S. capital inflow/trade deficit seem 
misplaced, the discussion highlights the role of the behavior of foreigners in determining 
the U.S. trade deficit. 
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In terms of our framework, this means that NFSN, the net foreign surplus for non-
reserve countries, is treated as the exogenous variable.  It is strongly positive.  The 
resulting net domestic savings must be deployed abroad, so that the strongly positive 
NSFN drives the offsetting U.S. position (NSFR) to be strongly negative.  The capital 
inflow into  the United States corresponds to a trade deficit, combined with weak 
aggregate demand from high imports, “forces” the government to have a large trade 
deficit (not unlike the earlier story for Canada.)  While the United States may be larger 
than any other country, it is still far smaller than the rest of the world put together.   
 
Savings Gluts As An Explanation 
 
This explanation for chronic U.S. international imbalances is, at least in recent years, 
related to the view of a global “saving glut” (see Bernanke (2004).10   There are many 
reasons that “the rest of the world” might have an imbalance of savings and investment.  
From a taxonomic perspective, a high value of NFSN, in turn, occurs because high private 
savings (NPSN) and low government deficits (NGSN) are not offset by comparably high 
rates of investment (IN).    
 
 There are two complementary versions of this argument.  The first is classical in 
spirit.  At full-employment local interest rates, determined by local capital market 
conditions, foreign investment opportunities (ultimately in the United States) are 
relatively attractive and savings are drawn from abroad.  This drives down exchange rates 
and creates surpluses in the external current accounts to offset the desired level of 
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external investment.  These surpluses then translate into U.S. deficits.  The second 
explanation is Keynesian in spirit.  Excess local savings relative to investment lead to 
local aggregate demand shortfalls.  If  local constraints on monetary and fiscal policy 
mean that they cannot compensate for this deficiency in aggregate demand, then full-
employment may still be pursued by manipulating exchange rates to produce offsetting 
current account surpluses (i.e. by selling local currency to drive down exchange rates).  
The net result is to export the excess savings (aggregate demand shortfalls) to the United 
States.  Again U.S. deficits are created by local current account surpluses.  
 These explanations may have some relevance for the last half decade: high oil 
prices have increased income in the oil exporting countries faster than they can invest the 
proceeds; and while governments (which, in most of the world, receive a large fraction of 
the increased value of oil sales) have used some of the proceeds to increase consumption, 
they prudently realize that these high oil prices may not last, and so have wanted to save 
substantial fractions of the income.  (Real returns in the United States may have not been 
as large as market participants believed; they were attracted to the U.S. by its bubbles, 
and the high apparent returns.  The fact that so much of the investment was going into 
housing—combined with the indicia of a bubble and widespread financial shenanigans—
should, perhaps, have been a warning.) 
However, while perhaps a partial explanation for the recent imbalance, both 
evidence and theory argue against this as an explanation for what has been going on for 
the past three decades.  Empirically, it is difficult to believe that a global “savings glut” 
has been a constantly increasing fact of international economic life for the past 30 years.  
Yet this is what the history of the U.S. current account deficit—i.e. almost constant 
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growth—requires.  Theoretically, it is not clear why over the long-run, a structural 
imbalance between global (non-U.S.) savings and investment should exist and why, if it 
does, the gap should not be offset on a country-by-country basis by appropriate local 
fiscal and monetary policies.  The fact that so much of the Rest-of-the-World is 
developing, with a capital scarcity, would suggest not a global savings glut, but a global 
savings dearth.  Over this period, the U.S., with the impending retirement of the baby-
boomers, should have been having a net savings surplus.   
 One thing that both explanations (twin deficits and global savings glut) have in 
common is that they focus primarily on the right hand side of equation (1) on a country-
by-country basis, although the global savings view does at least recognize the constraint 
embodied in equation (2).  An alternative is to focus on the left-hand side of equation (1); 
and the requirement of international balance (equation (2)) looking directly at the 
determinants of external balances, and then examining the consequences of international 
balance for domestic macroeconomic circumstances.  This generates dynamic behavior 
that appears to be far more consistent with the relevant history.  It also captures more 
effectively the full range of potential national behaviors in a world where there are policy 
variables that can be used to manage external balances (notably exchange rates) 
independently of local domestic macroeconomic goals.   
 
A Simple Global General Equilibrium Model 
 
A natural starting point of this alternative perspective is to examine national demands for 
reserves.  Just as individual households and firms hold cash to offset temporary 
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imbalances between income and expenditures, so do national governments presumably 
hold reserves to offset temporary imbalances between the supply of and demand for their 
currencies (i.e. foreign capital outflows and inflows).  Like cash holdings, the demand for 
reserves should grow with the volume of international transactions.  As international 
transactions volume grows over time, nations should seek to add to their currency reserve 
positions.  If the growth in transactions is proportional, then the size of these desired 
additions to reserves should also grow over time.  Since reserves can only be 
accumulated by running official balance-of-payment surpluses, the demand for reserve 
additions translates immediately into a demand for official surpluses.  As the level of 
desired additions to reserves grows, the level of these desired official surpluses grows as 
well. 
Especially since the 1997 global financial crisis, foreign governments have 
wanted to increase their currency reserves.  They have increased from 6-8 percent of 
GDP to 30 percent of GDP by 2004.11  Developing countries do not want to have to call 
upon the International Monetary Fund (IMF) for a bailout, in the event of a crisis.  There 
is a  high price to accumulating reserves—the money could have been spent, say, to 
increase investment and hence growth—but there is an even higher price to pay if they do 
not have sufficient reserves, and have to call upon the IMF.12  It is not just that the 
policies the IMF has imposed put the repayment of creditors above all else (even at the 
cost of countries sinking into recessions or depressions); borrowers must worry about the 
loss of sovereignty entailed by IMF conditionality.  Figure 17.9 shows the holdings of 
Total Reserves Minus Gold for both the industrialized and the emerging/developing 
countries.  Figure 17.10 shows the evolution of the spread in reserves between the 
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industrialized and developing countries.  Figure 17.11 shows the gold holdings of the two 
groups.  Note that the industrialized countries have been reducing their gold holdings just 
as the price of gold has reached record highs.  Meanwhile, the emerging markets have 
been slowly and steadily accumulating gold. 
 
<Insert Figure 17.9> 
 
<Insert Figure 17.10> 
 
<Insert Figure 17.11> 
 
There is another reason, not unrelated, why matters may have become “worse” in 
recent years.  In the past, countries offset the savings represented by reserve 
accumulations by profligate fiscal policies and loose monetary policies; or perhaps more 
accurately, some developing countries offset the savings of other developing countries.  
But in recent years, as the religion of sound fiscal and monetary policy has become 
adopted, there has been nothing to offset this saving of non-reserve countries.   
Of course, from the global perspective, a savings glut is nothing more than an 
insufficiency of aggregate demand.  Unless there is an excess of investment over savings 
in the U.S., at full employment, to make up for the excess of savings in the rest-of-the 
world, there will be a problem of global insufficiency of demand.  The money put into 
reserves is part of global output (=income) that is not being spent.  The United States has 
become the consumer of last resort—making up for the deficiency in aggregate demand 
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elsewhere—a problem which has become worse as other countries have learned to follow 
prudent monetary and fiscal policies.   At the same time, as other countries strive to make 
sure that they do not have large trade deficits (harbinger of a crisis to come), the United 
States has also become the deficit of last resort—as identity (2) makes clear that it must.   
At times, American government officials have been explicit about this role of 
America’s “imbalances.”  They have argued that the rest of the world should thank 
America for keeping up global demand and growth.  Yet, as we comment below, there is 
something peculiar about a global economic order which depends on the richest country 
of the world consuming beyond its means in order to maintain global full employment.   
 We can summarize these identities and behavioral relations in the following 
simple, global general equilibrium model 
NFSR ≡ – NFSN                                                                                                               (3a)  
NFSR ≡ NPSR (pR, vR,  e)  + NGSR (pR, vR, e) -IR(pR, vR, e)                                           (3b) 
NFSN ≡ NPSN (pN,vN, e) + NGSN (pN,vN, e)  – IN(pN,vN, e)                                            (3c) 
where pi is a vector of policy variables in the reserve (non-reserve) countries, vi is a 
vector of exogenous variables (preferences, technology, etc), e is the exchange rate.  
There are, of course, a large number of endogenous variables (prices, interest rates, etc,) 
within each country that we assume have been solved.13   
We decompose government savings into the demand for reserves and the fiscal 
deficit; the former we treat as exogenous, the latter as a function of policies (e.g. 
expenditure policies), the exchange rate, and exogenous variables. 
NGSN = NDRN + FD (pN, vN, e)            (3d) 
where NDRN denotes the aggregate demand for addition to reserves. 
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Equations 3 are identities—they are always true.  In the old, fixed exchange rate 
system, we can think of e as exogenous and of equations 3 as determining NGSN—the 
value of increases (decreases) in reserves that will, at the fixed exchange rate, ensure that 
equations (3) hold.  But in the era of flexible exchange rate that has prevailed for the past 
35 years, e is endogenous, and reserves are exogenous.14  If foreigners wish to hold more 
reserves, then there has to be a capital outflow from the non-reserve countries, a capital 
inflow into the U.S., i.e. imports must exceed exports, so the exchange rate has to rise to 
accommodate the capital inflow.15    
In this interpretation, the long-standing U.S. trade deficit is the result of the high 
demand for dollars as a reserve currency.  With growth of the non-reserve countries, they 
are holding more and more reserves.  In effect, the U.S. is exporting T-bills, to be held in 
reserves—partly at the expense of automobiles.  And, except when the U.S. is 
experiencing an investment boom—as in the 1990s—this means that the government 
must run a fiscal deficit to keep the economy at full employment.  In a sense, America’s 
story is much like that of Canada—though the complexity of the dynamics is such that 
the interaction between the trade deficit and the fiscal deficit is not as apparent. 
The model presented here is, of course, a gross simplification.  A more complete 
model would have similar equations for each date, a set of state variables, and a set of 
dynamic equations that describe the evolution of those state variables.  Yet, these 
dynamic equations would complicate the analysis, without affecting the basic points 
which we wish to make.16 
We should emphasize that there are a host of policy variables that can affect the 
exchange rate: anything that might affect the demand or supply of a country’s currency 
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today or in the future.  Hence, an increase in the fiscal deficit could increase national 
income, increasing imports at each exchange rate, and thereby increase the equilibrium 
exchange rate.17   
Allegations of exchange rate manipulation seem to be about intent: presumably, 
the policies of the American government which have led to a low exchange rate (or have 
they led to a higher exchange rate than otherwise would be the case?) were undertaken 
for other reasons.  But, of course, the same point can be made about interventions by 
those the U.S. accuses of exchange rate manipulation, and there are other instruments that 
they could make use of, which would have much the same effect.  China could, for 
instance, allow more Chinese to invest abroad.  There are good public policy reasons for 
doing this, but the effect would be to lower the exchange rate. 
 
A Special Case 
 
Analytically, the relationship between the demand for reserves and trade deficits can be 
seen most easily in the special case where there are no net private capital flows.  The total 
NFS for any single country consists of the official surplus plus the private surplus.  In 
terms of target levels, the NFS for a country will be the sum of the desired official surplus 
plus the desired private surplus.  The desired private foreign surplus consists of the 
difference between desired overseas investment by private domestic agents and desired 
foreign private investment in the country.   
As capital flows equalize returns (adjusted for risk) across national economies, 
private investment inflows and outflows should balance out over time.  However, desired 
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official surplus will always be positive, reflecting the continuing demand for additions to 
reserves as international transactions grow.  Assuming for convenience that desired 
private capital flows across non-reserve countries are zero18, the aggregate desired level 
of net foreign surplus for the non-reserve countries is equal to the sum of the desired 
official surplus or, equivalently, to the aggregate demand for additional  reserves.  
Symbolically,  
 NFSN = NFSN (official) = NDRN 
where NDRN denotes the aggregate demand for addition to reserves.  This figure is 
positive, as long as international transactions volume grows, and keeps growing, since 
growth in transaction volume is proportional.  Thus, as long as non-reserve countries 
attain their desired levels of reserve accumulations, the reserve money currency country 
(i.e. the U.S.) will be faced with chronic growing deficits (as the United States has).19      
The methods by which non-reserve currencies might attain these goals are fairly 
straight forward.  Favorable tax and regulatory treatment of export industries, 
impediments to imports and exchange rate management are the obvious ways to do so.  
However, if the reserve currency country is not content to run the required deficits, then 
these methods might be insufficient as each non-reserve nation struggles to acquire its 
desired share of a supply of reserves that overall is inadequate.  If all countries, including 
the reserve currency country, simultaneously seek to devalue their currencies, then none 
will succeed.  The further result may, therefore, be increasing barriers-to-trade, which 
will also be mutually defeating, or worse still, competing domestic deflations, designed to 
reduce import demand.   
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An example of this kind of situation in practice is the experience of crisis and 
contagion in the middle and late 1990s.  In the struggle to run net foreign surpluses, some 
countries will inevitably lose out; either because their policy options are inadequate to the 
task or, what amounts to almost the same thing, because they are unwilling to make the 
domestic economic sacrifices necessary to succeed.  Korea, Indonesia, Thailand and 
Malaysia appear to have been in this situation in the early to middle 1990s.  Despite 
various degrees of government fiscal restraint and rapid economic growth, they all 
experienced large deficits in the current account.  (In the case of Thailand, the 
government tried the standard procedure of raising interest rates to dampen demand; but 
this simply attracted more capital, strengthening the baht, and increasing the foreign trade 
deficit.  Ironically, Korea’s crisis happened just after it had managed to reduce its current 
account deficit.)  Ultimately, these deficits undermined confidence in their currencies, 
leading to capital flight, rapidly falling exchange rates, rising foreign debt burdens (in 
local currency terms) and severe economic contraction.  The combination of lower 
exchange rates and reduced economic activity (through reduced import demand) moved 
all these economies into net foreign surplus positions, but at great economic cost.  More 
importantly, as they moved into surplus, other countries necessarily had to move into 
greater deficit, since the aggregate zero constraint on ΣNFS (equation (2)) is always 
binding.  Deficits are like hot potatoes—so long as some countries are in surpluses, the 
sum of the deficits of the other countries must add up to the value of their surpluses.  If 
the U.S. did not absorb these new surpluses they would migrate to other relatively weak 
economies like Russia, Mexico and Brazil (as they did).  In the absence of sufficiently 
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high deficits by the reserve currency country, the whole reserve currency payments 
system is inherently unstable with a deflationary bias.   
Reserve accumulation represents a subtraction from global purchasing power.  If 
the United States were to fail to offset this subtraction by aggressive consumption and 
government deficit spending, the consequences might well be a serious prolonged global 
recession.  Yet as the United States does this, U.S. consumers, who are among the richest 
in the world, benefit at the expense of those (often much poorer) nations accumulating 
dollar reserves.  
Thus, chronic and growing U.S. deficits are an essential feature of the current 
system.  This basic imbalance may be exacerbated by a number of factors.  For 
idiosyncratic reasons, individual national economies may be committed to producing net 
foreign surpluses beyond their need for reserves.  One example already cited is that of 
countries like China that turn to foreign demand as an engine of output growth since they 
lack sufficient monetary and fiscal controls to manage their macroeconomies locally.  
(An alternative interpretation is that by distorting their economy towards exports and 
manufacturing, they increase their capacity to “learn,” to absorb technology from more 
advanced industrial countries.  While these benefits first touch the export sectors, they 
quickly diffuse throughout the economy.  Elsewhere, we have referred to this as the 
“infant economy” argument for protection, and we have argued that maintaining an 
“undervalued” exchange rate may be an efficient way of implementing such policies.20) 
Whatever the explanation, China has run large persistent net foreign surpluses as 
an adjunct to its domestic macro policy and these must be absorbed by other nations in 
the global system.21  Japan has also been in persistent surplus despite the advent of 
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flexible exchange rates in 1971.  It appears to regard itself as a resource poor, highly 
vulnerable economy whose security depends on a powerful ability to sell its 
manufacturers to the world at large.  The result has been a range of policies that through 
all domestic economic conditions has continued to produce net foreign surpluses, and 
again, these must be absorbed by the rest of the world.  In other countries, most notably 
in Europe, powerfully entrenched interest groups in manufacturing (unions and 
management) and agriculture have been protected over many years in ways that have 
generated persistent net foreign surpluses.  In agriculture this has been achieved by 
restricting import competition.  In manufacturing, since domestic demand has been 
inadequate to support these large establishments, foreign demand has been an important 
target.  To cite two examples, Germany and France (until very recently undermined by 
the rise in the Euro) have had long-lasting foreign surpluses on current account.   
These structural surpluses exacerbate the basic imbalance at the heart of the 
reserve currency system.  As Keynes noted deficits are self-limiting, as non-reserve 
countries run out of reserves.  Surplus countries as long as they neutralize the domestic 
inflationary pressure of surpluses can go on forever.  This is especially true in a flexible 
exchange rate world since surplus countries can always counteract the adverse 
consequences of rising pressure on exchange rates by selling their own currencies, which 
they possess, in unlimited supply.   
We have already noted another source of excess global demand for surpluses is 
the experience of countries like Korea, Thailand and Indonesia—and those who have 
learned from their experiences.  Having suffered the consequences of persistent deficits, 
these nations are likely to embrace policies (e.g. low exchange rates) that engender 
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persistent surplus as a precautionary matter.  By doing so, they exacerbate the problem of 
global balance and, in particular, of U.S. deficits.   
Having looked at the equilibrium system described by equations (1) and (2) from 
the perspective of net foreign surplus (NFS), it is relatively straightforward to examine 
the domestic macroeconomic consequences of global interactions.  In the reserve 
currency country, the result is chronic deflationary pressure which must be offset by 
aggressive monetary and fiscal policy, except when, by coincidence, the country 
otherwise would have been confronted with a period of excess demand.  That was the 
situation confronting America in the 1990s.  Irrational exuberance, then based on the 
internet bubble, was so great that in spite of the trade deficit, the economy could maintain 
itself at full employment.  (It benefited, too, from the deflation in China, combined with 
its stable exchange rate, which enabled America to have low manufacturing prices even 
with low levels of unemployment.  It was not the careful conduct of monetary policy in 
America that led to the benign confluence of high growth and low inflation, but the 
overinvestment in competitive manufacturing in China.   
In non-reserve currency countries, sudden changes in {vi, pi}—at home or 
abroad—can lead to sudden changes in exchange rates or reserves, with the potential of 
Asia type crises.   
What we have ignored, of course, is the mutual interaction of domestic and 
international policies.  They can be summarized as follows: 
 
(1) The efficacy and stability of the present system depends on continuing and 
growing U.S. foreign payment deficits.  
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(2) These foreign payments deficits exert a powerful deflationary effect on the 
U.S. domestic economy, which can only be offset by aggressive U.S. 
government fiscal and monetary policy.  
(3) These difficulties are exacerbated by chronic surplus countries whose 
behavior is difficult to control within the context of the current system.  
(4) These surplus countries tend to export deflationary tendencies not only to the 
United States, but also to other industrial economies.  
 
This list elucidates many of the shortcomings of the current dollar reserve 
currency system.  One final shortcoming of the present system should be noted.  As the 
U.S. increasingly becomes the deficit country of last resort, the world becomes 
increasingly awash in dollars.  This is an unavoidable consequence of the present system 
and the economic behaviors of powerful participating nations.22  Nevertheless, the flood 
of dollars inevitably undermines confidence in the value of the dollar which, in turn, 
contributes to exchange rate instability and concern in national economies about the value 
of their increasing level of dollar holdings.  The result is an increased level of concern 




While the global reserve system has contributed to weaknesses in the global economy 
and to its instability, it is a system that is particularly unfair to developing countries.  
They suffer particularly from the instability—especially given the failure of 
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international financial markets in shifting risk to the rich.  But while they pay a high 
cost from the failure of the system to produce stability, they also pay a high dollar cost 
directly in the way the system is run. 
In effect, the system allows the U.S. to have access to a ready supply of cheap 
credit.  This has resulted in the most peculiar situation noted earlier where the world’s 
richest country is living well beyond its means, borrowing from countries far poorer.  
Just as risk should move from the poor to the rich, but is not; so too capital should flow 
from the rich to the poor—but in fact is moving in the opposite direction.24 
There is essentially a net transfer from developing countries to the richest 
country in the world, as the poor countries make low interest loans to the United States 
(often reborrowing some of the money at much higher interest rates.25)  Obviously, 
these net transfers—which exceed the value of the aid many of the poor countries 
receive from the U.S.—have adverse consequences for their growth.26 
The cost to developing countries of holding dollar reserves in recent years has 
been very high.  China, for instance, has earned (in terms of its own currency) a return, 
which must be close to zero, or even negative, with the interest not compensating for 
the depreciation of the value of the dollar.  Surely, there are investments in their own 
country that would yield a higher return.  Developing countries maintain such large 
holdings in part at least because the cost of not having these holdings is even greater—
the risk of a crisis, with the attendant possibility of the loss of national economic 
sovereignty.   
The weakening of the dollar has had a profound effect in changing mindsets 
about reserves.  The dollar is increasingly no longer viewed as a good store of value.  It 
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has heightened a focus on reserve management, and this in turn shifts attention towards 
portfolio diversification.  Concern about low returns from holding T-bills has 
motivated the formation of sovereign wealth funds, which while they might rectify the 
inequities associated with differential returns, have in turned heightened protectionist 
sentiments. 
But as the example of China makes clear, there are multiple motivations for 
large reserve holdings.  The reserve holdings may be the result of a foreign exchange 
rate policy, with growth benefits identified earlier.  In estimating the net cost of reserve 
holdings, one has to subtract out the ancillary benefits.   
 
A Simple Reform Proposal 
 
The primary goals of any international monetary reform should be to alleviate these 
problems by (i) decoupling reserve accumulation from the deficit positions of any reserve 
currency countries, (ii) providing some means of disciplining surplus countries and (iii) 
providing a more stable store of international value than the dollar or any other reserve 
currency.  In addition, an international monetary reform should be equitable—with the 
benefits of any seignorage arising from reserves sharing equitably.    
One way to do this would be to issue special drawing rights (SDRs) on a 
substantial and regular basis as a non-reserve currency source of international reserves.  
Current international reserves are about $3000 billion.  Assuming the demand for 
reserves increases at the average rate of world trade (about 7 percent), an annual issue of 
$200 billion in SDRs would satisfy any demand for reserve accumulation without a U.S. 
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payments deficit.  The reserves could be simply credited to the IMF accounts of current 
member countries in proposition to their current IMF fund positions.   
 Since SDRs are valued as a weighted average of all convertible currencies their 
value is largely stable in the face of changing exchange rates.  Thus, as SDRs become 
more widely available as a source of reserves, they might ultimately serve as a stable 
international unit of account for pricing international commodities such as oil.  
 Finally, SDR allocations could serve as a basis for partially offsetting the 
externalities generated by chronic surplus countries.  SDR allocations could be taxed at a 
rate of 50 percent (or some other appropriate fraction) per unit of current account surplus 
up to the full amount of a country’s allocation.  The resulting SDR taxes could then be 
used as a source of global financial aid to be distributed among developing countries 
(who might then be required to subscribe to a set “good government” principles—e.g. 
nuclear non-proliferation—to qualify for such distributions).  
One could view the new reserve system as a form of cooperative mutual help.  
The international community would be providing entitlements to automatic “help” in 
times of crisis, allowing the country to spend beyond its means, beyond what 
international financial markets are willing to lend, as each country guarantees that the 
new reserve currency could be converted into their own currency.   
 
Political Economy of Reform: Incentive Compatibility   
 
In the limited space available here, we cannot discuss the political economy of the 
reform.  Suffice it to say that since the gains to all—including the United States—are 
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significant (described more fully in the next section), there should be widespread 
support.  But as an alternative, the reform could be implemented in a piecemeal 
manner, as a group of countries agreed to the new system, and agreed that those who 
join the system would gradually move toward holding only the new reserve currency 
and the currencies of other members of the “club” as reserves.  If enough countries 
joined the “club” there would be an incentive for any country that currently is a reserve 
currency (and believes that it gains from being a reserve currency) to join the club too.      
Here is how the club might work.  Every year, each of the members of the “club” 
would contribute a stipulated amount to the GRF (global reserve fund), and at the same 
time, the GRF would issue Global Greenbacks of equivalent value to the country, which 
they would hold in their reserves.  There is no change in the net worth of any country; it 
has acquired an asset (a claim on others) and issued a claim on itself.  Something real 
however has happened:  it has obtained an asset, which it can use in times of an 
emergency.   (And at the same time, it has agreed to let others call upon its resources in 
times of emergency.)   
Normally, of course, except for the cost of holding reserves, these exchanges of 
pieces of paper make no difference.  Each country goes about its business in the same 
way as it did before.  It conducts monetary and fiscal policy much as it did before.  Even 
in times of emergency, life looks much as it did before.  Consider, for instance, an attack 
on the currency.  Before, the country would have sold dollars (buying up its own 
currency) to support the value of its currency.  (Whether such intervention makes sense is 
not a question we address here.)  And it can continue to do that so long as it has dollars in 
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its reserves (or it can obtain dollars from the IMF).  Now, it exchanges the global 
greenbacks for conventional hard currencies to support its currency.27  28 
Because each country is holding Global Greenbacks, each no longer has to hold 
dollars or Euros as reserves, and for the global economy, this has enormous 
consequences, both for the (former) reserve currency countries, and for global economic 
stability.  The deflationary pressure noted earlier would no longer be present, because 
each country would no longer have to “bury in the ground” some of its purchasing power.   
Reserve currency countries, whose “exports” of IOU’s are matched by a current account 
trade deficit, would no longer face the systematic deflationary bias of net imports. 
For a country like the United States which has been tempted to have large fiscal 
deficits because of the low cost of financing these deficits, the enhanced discipline would 
contribute to long-term fiscal probity.  If it ran huge deficits year after year, it almost 
surely would face higher and higher real interest rates.   
 
Cost and Benefits of a Revised System 
 
Such a system appears likely to benefit all participants in the global financial system.  
Superficially, the greatest “loser” would be the United States, which would at least 
partially forego its monopoly on issuing paper claims for real goods and services.  
However, Britain enjoyed such a partial monopoly prior to Bretton Woods, and Keynes 
rightly recognized that it represented a very mixed blessing.  The benefits of seignorage 
were perhaps more than offset by the adverse consequences of chronic net foreign 
deficits through their deflationary effect on the domestic British macroeconomy.  The 
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United States has avoided many of these effects by running large, persistent government 
deficits to sustain full-employment, but that policy too has potential adverse 
consequences.  Keynes’ immediate solution for Britain’s situation was to off-load the 
dubious benefits of reserve currency status on the United States.  However, he ultimately 
envisioned a system similar to that outlined above (including discipline imposed on 
chronic surplus countries). 
The Euro community, to the extent that it too envisaged becoming a reserve 
currency, might also be said to suffer.  However, its recently ambiguous experience with 
the rise of the Euro appears to have qualified its enthusiasm for the chronic deficit 
position associated with reserve currency status.        
  Foreign central banks concerned with the stability of the value of their dollar 
holdings would benefit in three ways.  First, the creation of SDR reserves would provide 
an alternative store of value, which would at a minimum diversify their reserve holdings.  
At best SDRs would provide a far more stable store of value than any individual 
currency.  Second, the issue of SDRs would reduce the demand for dollar reserves and 
reduce the current account deficit of the United States.  This would reduce the continuing 
downward pressure on the value of dollar holdings (although there might be a significant 
interim adjustment in the value of the dollar).  Third, an external source of liquidity 
should alleviate some of the pressure of competition to acquire reserves, which should 
help stabilize international payment and exchange rate dynamics.   
With the annual issuance of these new reserves, the adverse consequences of 
the fact that the sum of deficits equals the sum of surpluses would be broken: any 
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country could run a deficit equal to its receipts of new reserves without worrying about 
a crisis.29  The “hot potato” problem would be reduced, if not fully solved.30 
The fact that each country receives annual emission of global greenbacks means 
that it can import more than it exports without facing an imminent crisis.  So long as 
imports do not exceed exports by more than the emissions, its reserves are actually 
increasing, and so there would be little anxiety of a crisis occurring.31  Because of the 
fact that under this system, the cost of holding reserves appears lower32, reserves may
higher (especially for developing countries), so that even when imports exceed exports by 
more than the value of the emissions, crises may be less frequent.  
 be 
The greater financial stability of developing countries would enhance their 
ability to issue debt in their own currency—thereby reducing at least exchange rate 
risks (one of the major sources of problems in developing countries). 
  All economies, not just the United States, should benefit from the reduction in the 
deflationary bias of the current system.33  And clearly the way the deflationary bias is 
addressed is far more equitable than under the current system.    
Finally, having a significant source of automatic purchasing power transferable to 
well-functioning developing economies would support economic development far more 
effectively than the current patchwork of national and multinational aid programs.  
 
The Evolving Reserve System 
 
The essential requirement of a reserve currency is that it be a good store of value.  This is 
why inflation has always been viewed so negatively by central bankers.  But the 
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credibility of a currency as a reserve currency depends also on exchange rates.  For 
foreign holders of dollars, a weakening of the exchange rate is as bad as an increase in 
inflation.  This is, in a sense, even true for domestic wealth holders; because of 
opportunity costs, even citizens of a country with a stable exchange rate may want to 
diversify out of holding assets denominated in that country’s currency if there is high 
instability.  
For most of the last part of the 20th century, U.S. dollars have been used as the 
world’s de facto reserve currency.  But the current system is under threat from negative 
dynamics, as confidence in the dollar erodes, causing people move out of the currency; 
and as they do so, the currency is further weakened.  While the huge fiscal and trade 
deficits of the Bush Administration have contributed to this weakening, the problem for 
the U.S. dollar is partly inherent; the Bush Administration simply accelerated what 
would have eventually happened in any case.  The reserve currency country naturally 
becomes increasingly indebted, because the ease of selling debt entices over-
borrowing.  Others want to hold T-bills; it is tempting to respond to the demand with an 
increase in supply.  But eventually, debt levels get so high that credibility starts to be 
questioned.  
This may well be happening today.  Certainly there has been a major shift in 
thinking among central banks.  Over the years, they have gone from thinking that a 
currency needs gold as backing to thinking that sterling is required to back their 
currency, to thinking that dollars should back their currency.  But now, they realize 
what matters is wealth.  They no longer rely solely on the dollar for their reserves, as 
they have realized that the dollar is not a good store of value, and are beginning to 
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manage their reserves as a more diversified portfolio, which is sensitive to risk and 
return.  With multiple hard currencies to choose from, central banks may find it prudent 
to hold reserves in multiple currencies—or even in other assets.  And as the U.S. dollar 
appears more risky, they will naturally continue to shift out of dollars—a process 
which is already well under way.34  
But this shift out of the dollar reserve system is not necessarily a smooth one.    
Now, investors have to think not only about how other investors are thinking, but also 
about how central banks are changing their perceptions of risk and reserve policy.35    
 
A Multiple Reserve Currency System? 
 
Having a two-reserve currency system is not a solution.  Some in Europe had hoped 
that the Euro would take on this role as a reserve currency.  This has happened, at least 
to some extent, but it has not been good for Europe, or the world. 
As the Euro becomes a reserve currency, Europe too then faces a deflationary 
bias.  Given its institutional structure, a central bank focusing exclusively on inflation 
and a growth and stability pact restricting the use of expansionary fiscal policy, there 
are doubts about whether Europe is able to respond effectively to the consequences of 
having a reserve currency.  If it does not, Europe, and the world, may face strong 
contractionary pressures.   
Moreover, just as the bimetallic system was viewed as more unstable than the 
gold standard, a multiple reserve currency system may be more unstable—with rapid 
shifts from one reserve currency to another with changing perceptions.  
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Europe—and the world—should hope that it does not get its wish, to become a 
global reserve currency; but rather, that the world move to a new global reserve system, 
along the lines we have proposed. 
 
Concluding Remarks  
 
It should be clear that the current global reserve system is not working well, that it is 
contributing to the current high level of exchange rate volatility, and that this volatility 
has adverse effects on the global economic system.  It is essential for the functioning of 
the global economic system that the global financial system functions well.  The global 
financial system and the global reserve system are changing rapidly but one should 
question whether they changing in ways which will enhance global economic stability.  
Certainly events of the last decades give us reason to pause and reflect on the 
weaknesses of the existing financial system.  We have witnessed repeated crises and 
high levels of global financial instability—in spite of the fact that we have (supposedly) 
increased our understanding of how financial markets work, and created new financial 
instruments to manage risk, and strengthened markets from an institutional perspective  
to help them perform better.  The developing countries in particular have experienced 
enormous instability, which has come at great cost to the people in those regions.  
Some of that instability is a result of instabilities in the global financial system and of 
the failure of markets to effectively shift risk to the developed countries, which could, 




                                                
There has been a great debate about allocating blame—the relative role of 
structural versus macroeconomic factors.  Here, we have highlighted one aspect of the 
global economic system, which we believe has received too little attention—the global 
reserve system.  We have suggested a simple reform to the global reserve system, 
which holds out the promises of greater stability, higher output, and enhanced equity.  
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capital flows that simultaneously are used to justify the differential treatment and exacerbate fluctuations in 
developing countries, and increase interest rate differentials.  See, e.g. some of the recent writings of 
George Soros.   
27 There is an important detail:  the exchange rate between global greenbacks and various currencies.  In a 
world of fixed exchange rates (the kind of world for which the SDR proposal was first devised) this would 
not, of course, be a problem; in a world of variable exchange rates, matters are more problematic.  So long 
as global greenbacks are held only by Central Banks, there is no real problem of speculation, so that the 
“official” exchange rate could differ from market exchange rates.  One could use current market rates; 
alternatively, the official exchange rate, for instance, could be set as the average of the exchange rates over 
the preceding three years.  In such a case, to avoid Central banks taking advantage of discrepancies 
between current market rates and the official exchange rate, restrictions could be imposed on conversions 
(for instance, such conversions could only occur in the event of a crisis, defined by a major change in the 
country’s exchange rate, output, or unemployment rate.) 
28 We envision global greenbacks only being held by Central Banks, but a more ambitious version of this 
proposal would allow global greenbacks to be held by individuals, in which case there would be a market 
price for global greenbacks, and the government could simply treat the global greenbacks as any other 
“hard” currency.   
29 Of course, the sum of deficits would still have to equal the sum of surpluses: this is an identity.   
30 Clearly, our proposal does not solve all of the problems leading to global instability of the financial 
system.  We have already called attention to the important asymmetries in policy responses (pro-cyclical in 
developing countries, counter-cyclical in developed countries.)  Countries with fully open capital accounts 
will still be afflicted with pro-cyclical private capital flows.  Our proposal would reduce (though not 
necessarily eliminate) the necessity of developing countries creating offsetting reserves, with the associated 
costs already noted.  One could go further, as Ocampo has done, in developing counter-cyclical allocations 
of global greenbacks.   
31 Crises can also be precipitated by short-term dollar denominated liabilities exceeding reserves (see Jason 
Furman and J. E. Stiglitz, “Economic Crises: Evidence and Insights from East Asia,” with Jason Furman, 
Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1998(2), pp. 1-114, and the references cited there); but again, 
because countries are likely to hold more reserves, it is less likely that this too will occur.   
32 In some sense, there is still an opportunity cost:  if there were no restriction of the kind set forth in the 
previous footnote, then the country could have converted the global greenbacks into dollars, and used the 
dollars to purchase productive assets.   
33 By the same token, the annual issuance of SDR’s would not be inflationary— it would just undo the 
existing deflationary bias of the current system.  
34 To the extent that motivation of holding reserves was to keep the exchange rate with the dollar low, 
countries may have limited scope for reallocating portfolios.  They have to keep in dollar denominated 
assets.  Even as they began to shift out of dollars, the emphasis on portfolio management to which we drew 
attention earlier has led them to move out of T-bills into other dollar-denominated assets.  This, in turn, has 
raised other concerns, raised most forcefully in the context of the debate over sovereign wealth funds. 
35 Changes in central bank holdings, or market perceptions of central bank holdings, may contribute to 
instability; but in fact, central bankers are likely to be less volatile in their behavior than private market 
participants. 
